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A B S T R A C T 
Current study review extant empirical researches on the relationship between CG and EQ. However, 
the scope of the reviewed studies was shown to vary, most studies on CG and EQ are specific in focus, 
with different studies focusing on specific aspects or measures of CG. This study evaluates the role of 
emerging policies and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms on earning quality within 
a conceptual framework for the Gulf cooperation council. This study concludes that the majority of 
companies with big board size, higher board independence, and more frequent meetings have improved 
EQ. Also, the result indicates companies with big audit committee size, a larger number of independent 
directors, more audit committee meetings and more experts tend to have an increase in EQ. Finally, 
this review emerged as a framework suitable for assessing the level of EQ disclosed and the 
relationship between CG and EQ base on GCC policies.  
 
© 2020 by the authors. Licensee SSBFNET, Istanbul, Turkey. This article is an open access article 
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).    
 
 
Introduction 
An emerging issue among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is the effort towards enhancing its policies or regulatory 
strength for effective corporate governance (CG). These policies are developed as means to minimize misconduct, 
bribery and corruption while ensuring transparency and disclosure by corporate bodies. The disclosures by corporate 
bodies is related to earnings quality (EQ), in turn, EQ guides capital market participants in making decisions regarding 
investments thus, directly influences firm’s cost of capital. To verify the association between various CG practices and 
EQ, several empirical researches emanated. However, there are issues among the findings of extant researches, as the 
concepts has proved indefinable and often argumentative because extant researches that examined EQ and CG indicated 
weak and inconsistent results.  
In the wake of the recent regulatory policies among GCC, the current study through extensive assessment of extant 
Literature attempt to establish trends and correlation between various CG practices and EQ. Base on the review a 
relevant framework consistent with the regulatory policies and CG practices among the GCC is developed. 
Studies on theory as well as empirical literature indicate the dependency between CG and reported earnings. However, 
this relationship is not fully understood specifically in the perspective of GCC countries. Predominant of the existing 
studies are concentrated within United State of America (USA) while research limitations exist among other regions 
such as the GCC. Additionally, there exists currently no consensus evidence regarding CG and EQ, that is, either they 
Research in Business & Social Science 
IJRBS VOL 9 NO 3 ISSN: 2147-4478 
Available online at www.ssbfnet.com 
Journal homepage: https://www.ssbfnet.com/ojs/index.php/ijrbs 
Obaid & Amrah, International Journal of Research in Business & Social Science 9(3)(2020) 157-164 
 158 
are complementary or substitute mechanisms (Gaio & Raposo, 2014). Corporate governance is an oversight activity 
done by the BOD and the AC to maintain a process of quality financial reporting. The limitations imposed by poor 
accounting information could lead to costly information procurement and monitoring instruments. Undeniably, 
investors will usually demand greater governance arrangements in the case where firms’ earnings are not clear or lack 
adequate information.  
Firms preferred to employs higher performance metrics in cases that accounting information is of limited use (Bushman 
et al., 1996). Ugbede et al. (2013) resolved that in Nigerian banks, the poor CG structures and practices greatly led to 
higher incidence and broader scope of earnings manipulation. Though, in Malaysian banks, the strong CG structures 
and practices were the central factors that predict and curtail the degree and level of earnings management. While, 
several studies examining the influence of CG practices on EQ in other contexts exist, there is however limited research 
that investigates this issue within the GCC context. A special characteristic of the GCC countries is the existence of the 
highest private and individual ownership while the minor shareholders have feeble legal protection. In light of the scanty 
research in this domain amongst the GCC, this study reviews studies on corporate governance mechanisms, which might 
relate to the earning quality for GCC countries. Accordingly, this review aims at developing a framework that could be 
employed towards establishing the level of CG measures by the GCC companies and their interration with EQ. This 
study was achieved through searches across various data bases, using the key words in the study. Followed by 
comparison of findings and extraction of relevant information to help achieve the goal of the study.  
The study focuses on the evolvement of a framework that focus on financial alongside non-financial firms listed in 
majorly GCC countries such as: Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, KSA, and UAE). Based on the review, a new framework 
emerged that conceptualizes the interlinkages between CG and EQ in the GCC Countries. This framework considers 
three mechanisms of CG which are: BODs, AC and audit quality. Whereas, a total of 11 factors are postulated as 
measures of the level of CG in GCC. The conceptual framework is subsequently presented in Figure 1. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of the extant literature, the 
conceptual framework of the study and conclusions. 
Literature Review 
 
Corporate governance (CG) signifies the structure and functioning of the corporate polity.  However, it was after the manifestation 
of two major events in the nineteenth century that CG started gaining much attention. The first event was in Russia, Asia and Brazil, 
where during the financial crises in 1998, the world economic and geopolitical setup were endangered due to deficient corporate 
behavior and governance. The second took place after the 2001 several self-inflicted scandals among which include some companies 
like; Enron, Banco Espirito Santo and Satyam Computers. These events smeared previously defective corporate fabrics and further 
destabilized world financial system (Pillai & Al-Malkawi, 2018). In recent times, the turbulent instabilities in oil market globally, 
Middle East political turmoil and the uncertainties of Brexit as well as US presidential policies led to economic diversification across 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as survival mechanism rather than success mantra. Nevertheless, the enlisted issue are pointers to 
innumerable ultimate reasons affirming why CG is now a key challenge to sustainable global development (Becht et al., 2002; Pillai 
& Al-Malkawi, 2018).  
The GCC are part of the developing capital market and have given much attention to improving its regulations through the 
development of CG regulations (Al-Sartawi, 2015), promotion of voluntary disclosure then investing in the growth of human 
resources as well as information systems. The GCC stand as or is regarded as “the heart of the Middle East” owing to its geographical 
location which enables the provision of rapid and effective access to entire market within the region. Essentially, the GCC 
concentrates on enticing domestic alongside foreign investors by employing numerous incentive measures. Such incentives includes 
not having either personal nor corporate income tax and complete foreign ownership of the real estate in virtually every sectors as 
well as business assets. Also, GCC play the role of financial center that is currently envisioned as foreign investors destination (Al-
Sartawi et al., 2016; Amrah & Obaid, 2019). Furthermore, for these investors to invest in the GCCs, some preferred qualities includes; 
good CG practices, appropriate EQ, alongside qualified and talented people, together with well-developed information systems.  
Although CG systems differ between countries, it has however been agreed that certain mechanisms such as ensuring corporate 
disclosure and transparency must exist to curtail the menance resulting from bribery, misconduct and corruption (Wahyudin & 
Solikhah, 2017). Thus, CG has been mounted to achieve a system of supervision that utilizes practices such as board structure, 
reporting, duality, along with remuneration for equiping shareholders with needed information to be able to ascertain management 
accountability for decisions made (Al-Malkawi & Pillai, 2012). Also, CG has been recognized as one of the factors that can reduce 
agency costs; therefore, by filtering through limiting unscrupulous conducts by management, the quality and reliability of reporting 
can be improved and also the value of the company will increase. One of the most important tasks of CG is to guarantee good financial 
reports which is related to earnings quality (EQ).  
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There exist no general definition for earnings quality although, the concept is concerned with the adequacy of information on earnings 
to indicate the economic reality (Antonio, Laela, & Darmawan, 2019). Healy and Wahlen (1999) asserted that the worth of any 
financial statements decline whenever reported earnings are not in consonance with economic reality. Several measures for EQ have 
emeged from extant researches such as accrual quality (Richardson et al. 2005). Similarly, high earnings quality (EQ) is more 
desirable and sustainable because a high EQ can stipulate information concerning future firm’s earnings (Antonio, Laela, & 
Darmawan, 2019; Penman & Zhang, 2002). Finding by earlier studies indicated a positive market response to earnings quality, 
particularly for inexperienced investors, as experienced or competent investors indicated a negative relationship between EQ and 
market response (Kalelkar & Nwaeza, 2011; Dechow, Ge & Schrand, 2010).  Thus, capital market stakeholders normally decides on 
investments by relying on earnings reported. EQ is therefore directly associated with firms cost of capital and a critical factor in terms 
of corporate sustainability. From this sustainability standpoint, previous findings have shown that response of the market participants 
to EQ differs to certain extent (Park, 2018; Lee et al., 2018).  
The relation between CG and EQ is indefinable and often argumentative among accounting researchers because some empirical 
studies that examine EQ and CG have found weak and inconsistent results (Larcker et al., 2007). There are two types of studies 
relatine to relationship between CG and a firm’s EQ. One category postulates that CG is among the key determinants of EQ whilst, 
the other category postulates that investors anticipate CG when earnings are reflected in the stock price (Shin & Kim, 2019). 
Accounting information is key in the CG process (Bushman & Smith 2001, 2003), whereas, financial reporting alongside disclosure 
are taken as significant components of CG (La Porta et al., 1998). The structures and practices of CG have been shown by different 
kinds of literature to consider important the efficiency of reported earnings, especially in the reduction of management opportunistic 
behavior towards earnings (Dechow et al., 1996). Financial accounting could concurrently represent an input or output of CG, as 
such higher EQ can read to more operative governance mechanism or vice versa. Based on this, there is a need for complementarity 
between CG and EQ.  
The study focuses on the evolvement of a framework that focus on financial alongside non-financial firms listed in majorly GCC 
countries such as: Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, KSA, and UAE). Based on the review, a new framework emerged that 
conceptualizes the interlinkages between CG and EQ in the GCC Countries. This framework considers three mechanisms of CG 
which are: BODs, AC and audit quality. Whereas, a total of 11 factors are postulated as measures of the level of CG in GCC. The 
conceptual framework is subsequently presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1: The Conceptual framework of the study 
Corporate governance mechanism and measures  
Corporate governance is an important global process considered to influence EQ, despite this, to date, the concept is deficient of 
strong putative theoretical backing or pattern (Abdullah & Valentine, 2009; Larcker et al., 2004). Different research has underlined 
quite a lot of variables considered as internal mechanisms among which include: BOD, AC and Audit quality. An analysis of the 
pattern of the nexus between CG and EQ has been the focus of most conducted studies. These studies employ different methodological 
approaches and CG mechanisms depending on data availability and the region under study. Among the key CG mechanisms in extant 
literature are board structure, reporting, duality, and remuneration. This study consequently reviews the various Measures of CG 
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Corporate governance mechanisms measurement  
Three important measures of CG mechanisms are focused in this review, these are; board of 
directors (BOD), audit committee (AC) and audit quality (AQ). In the case of BOD, three board characteristics are considered, which 
are; board size “number of directors serving the board); independent directors “percentage of independent directors serving the board” 
and BOD meetings (number of board meetings during the year). For audit committee, four characteristics where considered; the AC 
size (number of directors); AC independent (percentage of independent directors); AC meetings (total of AC meetings per year) and 
AC expertise (percentage of audit committee members with financial expertise). While audit quality has been considered as dummy 
variables. Findings of literature concerning these measures of cooperate governance are further presented.  
Earning quality measures 
It has been asserted that EQ is mostly observed indirectly through the use of proxies, thus, several proxies exist in literature for 
measuring EQ (Francis et al., 2006; Dechow et al., 2010). According to Dechow et al. (2010), three broad categories of earnings 
quality (EQ) measures exist which are: statistical properties of earnings; the investor responsiveness to earnings; and lastly, external 
indicators of financial reporting quality. Numerous proxies have been emplyed in assessing earnings quality, inorder to evaluate the 
various attributes of decision quality that researchers have measured, Several studies suggest that there is a single or best fit proxy 
for evaluating earnings quality in all decision contexts. Consequently, indicates further that EQ is context-specific, and thus our 
assessment of the ability of each measure to capture decision usefulness is also context specific (Dechow, Ge & Schrand, 2010).  
Among the notable measures are: Earnings response coefficients, Properties of earnings and External indicators of financial reporting 
quality measured as: Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs), Benchmarking, restatements, and internal control 
procedure deficiencies reported under SOX) (Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson, 2007; Karpoff, Lee, and Martin, 2008). Persistence 
and accruals, Asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition. This review employs two measurements of earning quality. First 
measurement is based on modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality model by Francis et al. (2005). The second 
measurement of earning quality is based on modified Jones model adjusted for firm performance (Kothari et al., 2005).  
Board of directors and earnings quality 
Extant studies on BOD have indicated that numbers or size of directors is a factor critically relevant towards board effectiveness 
(Bedard et al., 2004). However, there is no agreement on how the board size affects effectiveness (Jamaludina, Sanusib & 
Kamaluddin, 2015; Peasnell et al., 2005). A larger board may provide more skills and proficient environmental relation (Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003; Swastika, 2013). Within the context of criticisms of large boards, the agency theory offers explicit explanation 
regarding board features exclusive to the GCC. It assert that, the numbers of independent directors and directors with similar 
responsibility on erstwhile boards tend to offer valuable advice hence, the establishment of a small board size with such expertise is 
ideal for GCC. Therefore, considering studies by Rahman and Ali (2006); Ahmed et al. (2006) and Vafeas (2000), this study also 
assert the likely direction of the relation for the case of the GCC follows as; “There is a negative relationship between EQ and the 
size of the board of directors”. 
Another important BOD measure is board independence (Black et al., 2006). The BOD monitors the top administration (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Nonetheless, studies have emphasized that becoming an effective monitor requires that a board should involve 
independent directors. These independent directors can act independently of managers as well as contribute ample wealth of 
experience to the corporation. Also, they show willingness towards developing a great deal of reputation within the labor market 
although, it depends on the monitory performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Numerous studies such as Osma and Noguer (2007) have 
revealed a positive relationship among independent directors with the effectiveness of the board. Although most existing studies such 
as Peasnell et al. (2005) revealed that board independence has a negative link towards earnings quality behavior, which suggest that 
raising the number of independent board directors will lead to a decline in the frequency of earning quality. Conversely, finding in 
literature are mixed and inconclusive (Jamaludina, et al., 2015; Peasnell et al., 2005). Despite the mixed results, the theoretical 
argument, i.e. agency theory, undertakes that including more independent directors leads to increase the effectiveness of the board 
monitory function. Hence, it concludes that “the proportion of the independent directors on the board will have a significant effect 
on a firm’s EQ”. Similarly, different kinds of literature have shown the number of meetings by BOD to have effect on EQ. 
Audit committee and earnings quality 
The size of audit committee (AC) means the number of serving directors in the AU whereas, this size can either be large, small or 
medium (Alkdai et al., 2012). Size is mainly influenced by company’s size and its BOD, however, larger size may not necessarily 
translate to a more effective functioning but may result to unnecessary debates which will delay decision making. In many instances, 
earnings quality misinform users of financial statements through provision of incorrect information on company’s financial 
performance or state (Iturriaga & Hoffmann, 2005). Therefore, a larger audit committee may be key to constraining the occurrence 
of earnings management (Al Matari et al., 2014; Rezaei & Abbasi 2015; Abdul Rahman & Heneem, 2006; Oradi et al., 2017). 
Contrarily, studies of Yang and Krishnan (2005); Hillman and Dalziel (2003) indicate existence of a negative and significant 
relationship between audit committee size with earnings quality. Following the ownership structure of GCC companies, it is expected 
that large audit committees should have a positive effect on financial reporting quality. The review therefore, postulates that the size 
of the audit committee can influence the effectiveness of EQ. 
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As suggested by Bedard et al. (2004), for AC to fulfill its goal, it should become independent. Several studies (Klein, 2006; Solomon, 
2007; O’Sullivan & Wong, 1999) have reported a negative correlation between AC independence with earnings quality. A highly 
independent AC will give better governance than a less independent AC (Xie et al., 2003). The association that exist between 
percentage of independent directors in AC and earnings management has been reported to be negative and significant (Klein, 2002). 
Therefore, a logical assumption follows that: “the independence of an audit committee has a negative association with the earnings 
quality practice”.  
The number of audit meetings depicts a negative relation towards discretionary accruals. It was observed that increasing the frequency 
of meetings can decrease the earnings management among firms (Xie et al., 2003). However, it is worthy of note that,  numbers of 
meeting does not  suggest the amount of work that has been accomplished (Menon & Williams, 1994). Similarly, the audit committees 
with smaller number of meeting or without meetings are less likely to be good monitors. Concerning the expertise of the audit 
committee, Bedard et al. (2004) observed that firms whose AC members have high governance expertise reported lower earnings 
management. Based on the above kinds of narration, the review concludes to hypothesize as follows: “The independence of the audit 
committee is associated with the EQ of a firm. Similarly, the frequency of the audit committee meetings will have a significant effect 
on the EQ of a firm. While higher audit committee expertise will lead to higher EQ”. 
Audit quality and earnings quality 
Audit quality can be improved by employing big 4 (external auditors) which also reduces agency costs based on the agency theory 
which consequently enhance the EQ. Two critical arguments ensues which are the reputation and deep pocket hypothesis. These 
explained the positive relationship existing amongst audit type and quality. According to reputation hypothesis, large auditors tend 
to deliver quality services because of their propensity to loose client-specific rents in the absence of quality services (DeAngelo, 
1981). The deep pocket hypothesis that was proposed by Simunic (1980) and Becker et al. (1998) duel in the wealth of auditing 
companies that can be at stake in the event of litigation. Despite that the significance of big 4 has been reported to be inconsequential 
in many of the GCC countries (Aljifri and Mustafa, 2007; Alzharani et al., 2011), Al-Shetwi et al. (2011) highlight some big 4 roles 
in the minimization of earnings management among GCC. These variable results encourage the need for further studies. However, 
based on the significance attached to governance codes, concerted ownership structure along with outcomes from previous empirical 
assessments, as well as employment of the popular and significan big 4 in firms across GCC, this review further hypothesize the 
likelihood of a positive relationship between audit quality and EQ.  
Conclusions 
Current study review extant empirical researches on the relationship between CG and EQ. However, the scope of the reviewed studies 
was shown to vary, most studies on CG and EQ are specific in focus, with different studies focusing on specific aspects or measures 
of CG. The first category comprises of studies on board structure and EQ. The second category relates to studies on the audit 
committee and EQ. While the third category reviews studies on audit quality and EQ. In terms of their methods and tools of data 
analysis, some of these studies employed frequencies, percentages, line graphs or correlation coefficient to analyse the relationship 
between CG and EQ. Thus, these studies lack a sound econometric techniques for generalization of their findings or arguments. 
Another set of studies used just OLS in analysing their data. Also, the studies are considered limited to analysing variables that are 
quantitative and not variables in the qualitative form such as policy pronouncement. The final category employs more robust methods 
such as the logit/probit model, panels data models and the time series model such as difference and system GMM, or the ARDL 
models.   
However, most of the reviewed studies have been shown to cover aspects or measures that include; board size, independent directors, 
and BOD meetings (Board structure), the audit committee size, audit committee independence, audit committee meetings and audit 
committee expertise as well as audit quality and policies. Whilst, we have very scanty studies focusing on the GCC countries. 
Consequently, the review presents the conceptual framework for further empirical assessment of the interrelationship between CG 
and EQ for the GCC countries. Finally the literature reviewed, indicated that not every CG measures have equal importance or 
influence on EQ. As revealed by the mixed findings, the relationship between CG and EQ differs base on socio-economic features, 
policies, cultural factors including average level of economic development of the region. The differences in the study area have 
accounted for the variations and inconsistencies in findings related to the CG and EQ relationship.  
A recommendation is forwarded for an empirical study that examine the current framework to the GCC countries. The empirical 
result will show if companies with big audit committee size, more independent directors, more audit committee meetings and more 
experts are expected to have an increase in earning quality. Moreover, companies with higher audit quality are expected to have an 
increase in earning quality, this could be examined empirically across the GCC nations. Finally, a future empirical study will fill the 
gap that left by extant literature by assessing the level of earning quality practiced by listed companies in GCC. Especially, the 
relationship between CG and earning quality will be presented. 
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